Selective Self-Policing; Implicit Threats & General Deterrence

Can the implicit threat of sanctions create compliance from specific targets, if so under what conditions? This thesis investigates the role of sanctions threats as general deterrence, arguing that sanctions can function akin to general deterrence when both a committed sender and vulnerable target exist. Drawing on theories of sanctions application and perfect deterrence, I contend that the vulnerability and interdependence on the sender significantly alter the preferences of the target away from defection and toward compliance. Using a two-way fixed effects model and a two-stage least squared model to account for endogeneity, I find that from 1946-2012 states who are interdependent and vulnerable to the sender do alter their preferences toward more alignment. These findings are first demonstrated with a historical case study of the unique situations of France and West Germany following WWII. Both countries were in a unique situation of economic growth but reacted radically different to U.S. threats. This research contributes to the evolution of sanctions literature by considering how threats are not a random decision and affect shape target decision making before such a threat is made.