Ignorance before God : a Kierkegaardian account of innocence and the guilt of hereditary sin in dialogue with the cognitive sciences

This thesis contends that Søren Kierkegaard develops a comprehensive theological concept of innocence that offers a plausible resolution to the tension between inherited sin and personal guilt. Although rarely stated explicitly, a thorough examination of both his signed and pseudonymous texts reveals that innocence, defined as ignorance rather than moral perfection, serves as a central concept in his theology. Furthermore, it is argued that this Kierkegaardian account is supported by, and can be further developed through, recent research in the cognitive sciences. Part I examines Kierkegaard’s interpretation of hereditary sin and his exegesis of the Fall, asserting that since true guilt necessarily presupposes the actual loss of innocence, and to preserve our fundamental equality before God, all individuals, like Adam, must begin in an existential state of innocence. Part II reconstructs Kierkegaard’s ontology of selfhood, freedom, historical existence, and the qualitative leaps of sin and faith, demonstrating how each person begins anew in innocence without negating the existential consequences of hereditary sin. Part III engages contemporary neuroscience, developmental psychology, and narrative theory to argue that genetic and environmental influences on nonconscious learning processes during early childhood shape a person before self-awareness emerges, resulting in a “narrative groundlessness” at the beginning of existence that substantiates Kierkegaard’s conception of innocence as ignorance. Ultimately, the thesis defends a subjective account of sin that rejects fatalism and determinism, proposing that individuals freely appropriate the guilt of inherited sin through personal sin-consciousness and repentance. Insofar as it is before God, repentance posits sin as actual and therefore constitutes the true transition from innocence to guilt.