Wage-Curve Slope, Signal Accumulation, and Compounded Pay Drift

This paper develops a theorem-driven structural account of wage-curve divergence under individually differentiated pay setting above contractual or collectively secured baseline wage movement. The central claim is non-normative. Wage drift is not treated as punishment for absence, proof of merit, or evidence of distributive justice. Instead, the paper models wage-curve divergence as a mechanical consequence of repeated salary revisions in which discretionary increases require observable assessment material, become incorporated into future salary bases, and compound over time. Using Axiomatic and Synthetic Theory (AST), the paper derives a scope-bound structure linking baseline movement, discretionary allocation, signal accumulation, exposure density, conversion into wage capital, schedule-bound work constraints, transactional compensation, and external wage recalibration through employer switching. The paper is a theory-generating preprint. It does not conduct empirical testing, estimate effect sizes, or offer legal or normative conclusions. Its purpose is to provide a locked theorem structure for later theorem translation and empirical instantiation.