Вимоги до інформаційно-допоміжних дій для фізичного захисту авіабази в умовах високотемпових атак противника

The study addresses information processes in the physical protection of airbases and airfields operating under high-tempo conditions, where dense legitimate activity increases ambiguity and produces heavy alarm load. The paper focuses on information-to-action performance as a sufficiency-critical factor that links sensing to validate decisions dispatch, and response activation within a time window that enables interruption before the adversary reaches a critical element. The aim is to derive measurable information-to-action requirements for aviation facilities that remain defensible under concurrency, false-alarm surges, degraded communications, and insider-assisted conditions. The methodology combines a bounded scenario library with a latency decomposition into , bottleneck identification per scenario class, and requirement derivation as time bounds and quality targets. Acceptance is specified through predefined evidence channels, including instrumented timed drills, SOC and C2 log analysis, stress tests for alarm-load and degraded communications, and simulation or hybrid evidence for rare multi-event regimes. Results include an airbase scenario matrix mapping dominant information bottlenecks to verification pathways and a metric catalogue with target types for latency, detection and classification quality, false-alarm resilience, and communications availability. The findings indicate that sufficiency erosion is primarily driven by growth in validation and decision latency under ambiguity and overload, not by sensor presence alone. The framework is applicable to conceptual design, procurement specifications for SOC and C2 workflows, acceptance testing programs, and lifecycle revalidation using operational logs and after-action review.