Quantum Computing Threats to Cryptographic Infrastructure: A Quantitative Analysis of Post-Quantum Migration Readiness for National Security Systems

Advancing quantum computing capabilities pose an existential threat to the public-key cryptographic infrastructure—RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman key exchange—that secures national security systems, critical infrastructure, and classified communications. National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10) mandates that federal agencies complete migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by 2035, yet the feasibility of achieving this deadline remains empirically unquantified. This quantitative study assessed four interrelated dimensions of the post-quantum migration challenge for U.S. national security systems through analysis of six curated datasets: quantum hardware metrics (N = 46), PQC algorithm benchmarks (N = 24), National Vulnerability Database cryptographic vulnerabilities (N = 856), cryptographic library vulnerabilities (N = 39), federal agency migration data (N = 22), and PQC TLS network performance data (N = 19). Analytical methods included polynomial and logistic regression, Kruskal-Wallis tests, chi-square analysis, logistic regression, and Monte Carlo simulation (10,000 iterations). Results revealed four convergent findings. First, a cubic polynomial model (R² = .906) projected that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could compromise RSA-2048 by approximately 2042, while a logistic saturation model (R² = .991) suggested a potential qubit plateau at approximately 1,237 qubits. Second, statistically significant performance differences existed across PQC algorithm families (p < .01), with ML-KEM demonstrating the fastest key generation (12–31 µs) and effect sizes up to η² = .893. Third, implementation vulnerabilities constituted 82.1% of cryptographic CVEs, with no significant association with severity (χ² = 4.216, p = .239). Fourth, the probability of all federal agencies completing migration by 2035 was 0.03% (median completion: 2041.2). These findings reveal a significant urgency-readiness gap between quantum threat emergence and federal migration capacity. Algorithm migration alone addresses less than 20% of the cryptographic vulnerability surface. Risk-based prioritization, phased compliance frameworks, and concurrent investment in implementation security are recommended to bridge the gap between the quantum threat timeline and organizational readiness.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-05-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20344496
Primary Topic
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Quantum Computing Threats to Cryptographic Infrastructure: A Quantitative Analysis of Post-Quantum Migration Readiness for National Security Systems

Laszlo Pokorny
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
article

Quantum Computing Threats to Cryptographic Infrastructure: A Quantitative Analysis of Post-Quantum Migration Readiness for National Security Systems

Laszlo Pokorny
article en

Abstract

Advancing quantum computing capabilities pose an existential threat to the public-key cryptographic infrastructure—RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman key exchange—that secures national security systems, critical infrastructure, and classified communications. National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10) mandates that federal agencies complete migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by 2035, yet the feasibility of achieving this deadline remains empirically unquantified. This quantitative study assessed four interrelated dimensions of the post-quantum migration challenge for U.S. national security systems through analysis of six curated datasets: quantum hardware metrics (N = 46), PQC algorithm benchmarks (N = 24), National Vulnerability Database cryptographic vulnerabilities (N = 856), cryptographic library vulnerabilities (N = 39), federal agency migration data (N = 22), and PQC TLS network performance data (N = 19). Analytical methods included polynomial and logistic regression, Kruskal-Wallis tests, chi-square analysis, logistic regression, and Monte Carlo simulation (10,000 iterations). Results revealed four convergent findings. First, a cubic polynomial model (R² = .906) projected that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could compromise RSA-2048 by approximately 2042, while a logistic saturation model (R² = .991) suggested a potential qubit plateau at approximately 1,237 qubits. Second, statistically significant performance differences existed across PQC algorithm families (p < .01), with ML-KEM demonstrating the fastest key generation (12–31 µs) and effect sizes up to η² = .893. Third, implementation vulnerabilities constituted 82.1% of cryptographic CVEs, with no significant association with severity (χ² = 4.216, p = .239). Fourth, the probability of all federal agencies completing migration by 2035 was 0.03% (median completion: 2041.2). These findings reveal a significant urgency-readiness gap between quantum threat emergence and federal migration capacity. Algorithm migration alone addresses less than 20% of the cryptographic vulnerability surface. Risk-based prioritization, phased compliance frameworks, and concurrent investment in implementation security are recommended to bridge the gap between the quantum threat timeline and organizational readiness.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US), Fujitsu (United Kingdom) (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
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