Research on Green Supply Chain Investment Strategies Considering Multi-Dimensional Consumer Preferences and Distrust Under Government Intervention

To address the “greenwashing” trust crisis induced by information asymmetry in sustainable supply chains, this study develops a comprehensive game-theoretic model integrating Stackelberg and evolutionary game theories (EGT). We quantitatively investigate the dynamic interactions among multi-dimensional consumer preferences, blockchain implementation costs, and boundedly rational government interventions. Our analysis yields three core contributions. First, we analytically reveal the “double-edged sword effect” of blockchain adoption. While structural transparency unlocks a trust dividend, exorbitant technological costs trigger a “budget crowding-out effect.” Quantitative results demonstrate that breaching the absolute Feasibility Threshold completely cannibalizes the environmental budget, driving substantive green investments strictly to zero. Second, EGT analysis proves that isolated punitive carbon taxes trap supply chains in a suboptimal “shallow greening” equilibrium. A composite tax-subsidy policy is structurally required to expand the feasible cost space and hedge against technological risks. Finally, we formulate a dynamic policy exit mechanism. As blockchain infrastructure matures and the endogenous green premium effectively offsets implementation costs, regulators must systematically phase out subsidies and converge toward a single-taxation regime to prevent corporate policy arbitrage and alleviate long-term public financial burdens.