Deterministic Theories

ABSTRACT Determinism is (roughly) the thesis that the past determines the future. But efforts to define it precisely have exposed deep methodological disagreements. Standard possible‐worlds formulations of determinism presuppose an “agreement” relation between worlds, but this relation can be understood in multiple ways, none of which is particularly clear. We critically examine the proliferation of definitions of determinism in the recent literature, arguing that these definitions fail to deliver clear verdicts about actual scientific theories. We advocate a return to a formal approach, in the logical tradition of Carnap, that treats determinism as a property of scientific theories, rather than an elusive metaphysical doctrine. We highlight two key distinctions: (1) the difference between qualitative and “full” determinism, as emphasized in recent discussions of physics and metaphysics, and (2) the distinction between weak and strong formal conditions on the uniqueness of world extensions. We argue that defining determinism in terms of metaphysical notions such as haecceities is unhelpful, whereas rigorous formal criteria such as Belot's D1 and D3 offer a tractable and scientifically relevant account. By clarifying what it means for a theory to be deterministic, we set the stage for a fruitful interaction between physics and metaphysics.