Evaluating Large Language Models in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Taxonomy and Empirical Analysis

This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on the evaluation methodologies and capability boundaries of Large Language Models (LLMs) in cybersecurity. We propose a Three-Dimensional Taxonomy Matrix to systematize existing metrics across offensive domains, defensive applications, and inherent architectural flaws. Beyond categorization, this matrix functions as a predictive framework to expose structural evaluation blind spots. Specifically, by intersecting target domains with failure attributions, it identifies a critical, unresolved frontier: measuring cross-architecture semantic equivalence in low-level reverse engineering. Empirically, synthesizing 39 frontier benchmarks reveals a systemic evaluation gap: static metric success rarely translates into end-to-end adversarial efficacy. In offensive domains, high penetration rates correlate strongly with pre-training data contamination. When subjected to semantics-preserving code obfuscation as a stress test, zero-shot, tool-free exploit success rates collapse to near 0%. In defensive contexts, cross-procedural code auditing struggles, yielding a peak F1-score of only 23.83%. Furthermore, models suffer from over-alignment-induced functional degradation, with joint-testing frameworks recording up to a 77% functional loss in automated program repair. Our analysis strongly suggests that purely autoregressive mechanisms drive severe technical hallucinations, evidenced by a 19.7% package dependency fabrication rate. Evaluations also expose significant attack surfaces and a significant safety-utility tradeoff: models succumb to prompt leakage attacks at rates up to 86.2%, while heavily aligned versions simultaneously exhibit excessively high False Refusal Rates (FRR) for benign, borderline security queries. Finally, we delineate a theoretical neuro-symbolic roadmap—integrating LLM heuristics with deterministic formal methods—to structurally mitigate the limitations of the autoregressive paradigm.

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Publication Details

Journal
Electronics
Published
2026-05-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15102222
Primary Topic
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Evaluating Large Language Models in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Taxonomy and Empirical Analysis

Hongcheng Zou, Mantun Chen, Ting Su, Hua Cheng et al.
Electronics
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
article

Evaluating Large Language Models in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Taxonomy and Empirical Analysis

Hongcheng Zou, Mantun Chen, Ting Su, Hua Cheng, Minghui Chen, Wenjun Cai
article en

Abstract

This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on the evaluation methodologies and capability boundaries of Large Language Models (LLMs) in cybersecurity. We propose a Three-Dimensional Taxonomy Matrix to systematize existing metrics across offensive domains, defensive applications, and inherent architectural flaws. Beyond categorization, this matrix functions as a predictive framework to expose structural evaluation blind spots. Specifically, by intersecting target domains with failure attributions, it identifies a critical, unresolved frontier: measuring cross-architecture semantic equivalence in low-level reverse engineering. Empirically, synthesizing 39 frontier benchmarks reveals a systemic evaluation gap: static metric success rarely translates into end-to-end adversarial efficacy. In offensive domains, high penetration rates correlate strongly with pre-training data contamination. When subjected to semantics-preserving code obfuscation as a stress test, zero-shot, tool-free exploit success rates collapse to near 0%. In defensive contexts, cross-procedural code auditing struggles, yielding a peak F1-score of only 23.83%. Furthermore, models suffer from over-alignment-induced functional degradation, with joint-testing frameworks recording up to a 77% functional loss in automated program repair. Our analysis strongly suggests that purely autoregressive mechanisms drive severe technical hallucinations, evidenced by a 19.7% package dependency fabrication rate. Evaluations also expose significant attack surfaces and a significant safety-utility tradeoff: models succumb to prompt leakage attacks at rates up to 86.2%, while heavily aligned versions simultaneously exhibit excessively high False Refusal Rates (FRR) for benign, borderline security queries. Finally, we delineate a theoretical neuro-symbolic roadmap—integrating LLM heuristics with deterministic formal methods—to structurally mitigate the limitations of the autoregressive paradigm.

ElectronicsVol. 15(10)
National University of Defense Technology (CN), Academy of Military Medical Sciences (CN)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
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