Oligarchs, Politicians, and the Public: Examining Oligarchic Networks of Influence and Public Attitudes Towards the Superrich in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine

This dissertation consists of three papers. In the first paper, I develop an innovative, network-based approach to studying legislatures captured by wealthy elites in developing democracies. I argue and show that, in the context of a competitive political environment and weak rule of law, oligarchs defend their wealth by promoting as members of parliament individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. Through their networks of loyal legislators, oligarchs influence the adoption of policies related to their economic interests, as well as policymaking more broadly. I develop and test these arguments using social network and regression analyses of original quantitative data and interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine (2014-2019). The study has important implications for the literatures on money in politics, state capture, crony capitalism, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation. The second paper builds on the first one by extending the analysis of legislative state capture in Ukraine to the most recent parliamentary convocation (2019-2022). Relying on original quantitative data and qualitative evidence, I show that the pattern of oligarchic legislative influence discovered in the period 2019-2022 remains remarkably similar to the one observed in the immediate post-Euromaidan period (2014-2019). In the third paper, I theorize and empirically analyze the determinants of public attitudes towards redistribution from the superrich during wartime in developing countries. I argue that attitudes follow a compensatory logic—for their sacrifices at the front, ordinary citizens demand compensation from the state in the form of redistribution from the superrich. These attitudes, however, are further shaped by individual oligarchs’ wartime and past behavior. I test my theory with an original conjoint survey experiment conducted in Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion. I find that citizens support redistribution from oligarchs who made their initial fortunes in illegal ways and who captured state institutions, and oppose redistribution from oligarchs who were in the country at the time of war onset and who provide significant amounts of aid. The study contributes to our understanding of public support for redistribution during wartime, public support for the superrich, and oligarch survival in the context of developing countries.