Costly Signals and Commitment Under Uncertainty: A Behavioral Observation Framework

Abstract This paper presents a behavioral framework for assessing commitment risk in early-stage romantic relationships. In this environment, information asymmetry is severe and most signals people give — words, gestures, expressions of interest — are cheap to produce and easy to imitate. Drawing on costly signaling theory, the main idea is that actions involving genuine personal cost can distinguish true commitment intentions from imitations more reliably than verbal statements alone. The framework uses temporal compression: it observes what happens when stated commitments must turn into actual behavior within a short time window. Under this pressure, four recurring patterns tend to emerge: the degradation of polished self-presentation when consistency is required; the reframing of boundary conversations into tests of the observer’s character; gradual disengagement after strong initial compliance; and the observer’s own sunk cost escalation. Preliminary behavioral log data (N=35, eight-week observation) suggest that low word-deed consistency, high conflict frequency, and declining consistency trends are associated with relationship dissolution. These findings are exploratory. The framework is offered as a provisional set of observational tools that is still evolving, presented here as a working document.