International water weaponization: The India–Pakistan case

The Indus Basin has long been both a lifeline and a fault line, where the vulnerabilities inherent in transboundary water governance are amplified by India’s upstream position and Pakistan’s downstream position, as well as by deep-seated political and territorial disputes between these riparian neighbours. Such upstream–downstream power asymmetries and entrenched disputes culminated in 2025 when India permanently suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and unilaterally closed the sluice gates of the Baglihar dam on 4 May 2025, reducing by up to 90% the Chenab River’s flow to Pakistan. India’s actions emerged as a response to the Pahalgam terror attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on 22 April 2025, and render visible its power to control the Indus Basin’s water flows due to its upstream geography. Drawing on Grech-Madin’s revised conceptual framework, this article examines how India’s unilateral management of the Chenab River’s waters through the closure of the Baglihar dam constitutes a case of international water weaponization. I argue that the closure of this dam in the Chenab River represents a case of international water weaponization on multiple levels, unfolding through a continuum of escalating water violence practices, encompassing rhetorical threats, treaty suspension and physical obstruction.