Defensive debunking arguments: Why Moorean objections to the moral error theory fail

Abstract Debunking arguments in metaethics are generally viewed as arguments against moral realism. In this paper, I distinguish these kinds of arguments, which I label offensive debunking arguments, from defensive debunking arguments, which are used to defuse specific pieces of evidence. I then argue that moral error theorists can use defensive debunking arguments to undermine Moorean arguments against the view by providing plausible debunking explanations for our moral beliefs. Crucially, these explanations have a much lower burden of proof than in explanations within offensive debunking arguments. Rather than needing to meet a high empirical bar, these explanations merely need to provide a plausible explanation for our moral beliefs on which they are not truth tracking. Not only does this distinction strengthen extant responses to Moorean arguments by showing that they have a low burden of proof, but it also helps to show why recent versions of the Moorean objection fail.