Gene drives and biosecurity: Dual-use risks, governance gaps and monitoring needs

Gene drives raise biosecurity questions because their defining feature (inheritance bias) could enable genetic traits to spread through sexually reproducing populations over generations. This article examines how gene drive biosecurity differs from biosafety, focusing on dual-use concerns, unauthorised release, weak oversight, attribution challenges and potential misuse scenarios. It reviews examples discussed in the literature, including cross-border spread, agricultural disruption, altered disease-vector populations, informal or DIY research, and possible interference with ecosystems or food systems. The article also considers the biological, technical and ecological constraints that limit misuse potential, including organism-specific expertise, sexual reproduction, population structure and uncertainty in field performance. It discusses governance gaps, monitoring needs, detection tools and mitigation strategies, emphasising that biosecurity concerns should be assessed cautiously rather than treated as imminent threats. As a living literature review, this article will be updated as new evidence, capabilities and governance approaches emerge.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-05-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20284770
Primary Topic
Genetically Modified Organisms Research
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Gene drives and biosecurity: Dual-use risks, governance gaps and monitoring needs

Felix Moronta Barrios, Muris Hodzic
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Genetically Modified Organisms Research
article

Gene drives and biosecurity: Dual-use risks, governance gaps and monitoring needs

Felix Moronta Barrios, Muris Hodzic
article en

Abstract

Gene drives raise biosecurity questions because their defining feature (inheritance bias) could enable genetic traits to spread through sexually reproducing populations over generations. This article examines how gene drive biosecurity differs from biosafety, focusing on dual-use concerns, unauthorised release, weak oversight, attribution challenges and potential misuse scenarios. It reviews examples discussed in the literature, including cross-border spread, agricultural disruption, altered disease-vector populations, informal or DIY research, and possible interference with ecosystems or food systems. The article also considers the biological, technical and ecological constraints that limit misuse potential, including organism-specific expertise, sexual reproduction, population structure and uncertainty in field performance. It discusses governance gaps, monitoring needs, detection tools and mitigation strategies, emphasising that biosecurity concerns should be assessed cautiously rather than treated as imminent threats. As a living literature review, this article will be updated as new evidence, capabilities and governance approaches emerge.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Zero hunger
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Genetically Modified Organisms Research
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Gene drives and biosecurity: Dual-use risks, governance gaps and monitoring needs — Felix Moronta Barrios, Muris Hodzic · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS