The life-world as the empirical basis of science

Abstract The empirical foundation of science has often been characterised in terms of the observable-unobservable distinction, developed either syntactically, as a set of statements, or semantically, as aspects of the world represented by models. These approaches have faced well-known challenges: the difficulty of drawing a sharp line between observables and unobservables, the theory-ladenness of observation, and the problem of specifying what, exactly, is observed. We take up these challenges by developing an alternative framework inspired by the phenomenological concept of the life-world. Our proposal offers several advantages: it provides a richer characterization of the foundational level, clarifying the conditions of possibility for inquiry and avoiding overly narrow views that equate the empirical basis with linguistic statements or model components; it stresses the role of the empirical basis not only in individuating phenomena and testing claims, but also in sustaining scientific inquiry throughout; it extends beyond the senses to include cognitive and practical dimensions that shape experience and scientific practice; it foregrounds the role of the observing subject; it highlights the continuity between observation and theory, and between scientific and extra-scientific sense-making; and it integrates the most compelling, if sometimes at first pass conflicting, relevant analytic insights.