The mobilization curse? How oil wealth affects the composition of resistance episodes

How does oil shape anti-state dissent? While previous research suggests that oil wealthy countries may be less likely to democratize and more likely to experience civil wars, few studies have examined how oil wealth shapes the broader composition of anti-state resistance, from political parties, to trade unions, and CSOs. We argue that high levels of oil wealth lower the probability that economically based organizations (such as trade unions) and civil society organizations participate in anti-state dissent by eroding the supply of these organizations and enabling selective cooptation and repression. However, we also argue that oil wealth does not impact political parties, armed rebel groups, and what we label “protest organizations” in the same way, leading to dissent that is more concentrated around organizations designed to capture state power. Using data on the organizational composition of resistance campaigns in Africa from 1990-2015, our findings suggest that high levels of oil wealth reduce the probability of observing economic organizations and CSOs among dissenting organizations and the probability that organizations in general mobilize from economic sectors. Mechanism tests suggest that oil limits the participation of economic organizations in dissent by shrinking or impeding the development of a strong manufacturing sector. • We study whether levels of oil wealth affect the composition of anti-regime dissent in Africa from 1990–2015. • Quantitative modelling indicates that greater oil wealth in Africa lowers the probability that dissenting organizations are CSOs or trade unions. • Oil wealth has a weaker association with political parties in dissent. • Dissent in oil wealthy states in Africa concentrates in protest organizations and armed rebel groups. • We find evidence that oil wealth weakens the manufacturing sector with flow-on impacts for dissent by CSOs and economic organizations.