The" Onderzoeksplicht" Paradox: Statutory Duty to Investigate, Documented Follow-Up Gaps, and the Financial-Sector Reporting-Investigation Architecture in Dutch Implementation of EU AML and Whistleblower Frameworks — A PRISMA Systematic Review and Mi

The Dutch financial sector operates under a multi-layered statutory framework of duties to investigate. Article 23 of the Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (Wwft) requires obliged entities to investigate suspicious-transaction indicators and to report unusual transactions to FIU-Nederland. Article 38 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 (AMLD 4) imposes corresponding investigation duties on obliged entities including a duty to ensure that internal reporting persons are not subject to threats or retaliation. The Wet op het financieel toezicht (Wft) imposes prudential and conduct-of-business duties on financial institutions including duties to investigate operational deficiencies. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) as prudential supervisor, the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) as conduct supervisor, and FIU-Nederland as financial intelligence unit hold supervisory and investigative competences. Cluster B Article B-1 documented the Algemene Rekenkamer 2026 audit finding that the central enforcement bodies do not assess the effectiveness of their own activity. Article 60 of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (the recast Sixth AML Directive, transposition deadline 10 July 2027) extends specific whistleblower-investigation duties into the financial-sector AML domain. Despite the layered statutory framework, the documentary record raises questions concerning the substantive effectiveness of Dutch financial-sector duty-to-investigate implementation.