Free will, luck and control

Abstract One challenge to the notion of libertarian free will arises from the Luck Argument. This argument has been claimed to undermine the idea that if an agent only makes probable a particular decision, then the agent is not in control of the decision. The present paper argues the claims of the Luck Argument do not seem to seem very plausible with respect to the choices we make in response to pleasure and pain. In the paper it is argued that the way we respond to pleasure and pain provides us with a way of responding to the influential version of the Luck Argument due to Peter van Inwagen. The approach suggested here is contrasted with a response to the problem by Alfred Mele. It is also argued that the approached suggested here enables us to deal with a reformulation of the argument due to Seth Shabo. It is concluded that focussing on our responses to pleasure and pain is a promising way of dealing with the challenge to libertarian free will arising from the Luck Argument.