Do investors discipline cost stickiness: evidence from Chinese interactive disclosure platforms

Purpose This study investigates whether investor attention to firms’ cost-related activities mitigates asymmetric cost behavior and explores the mechanisms through which investor scrutiny influences managerial decisions. Design/methodology/approach We analyze investor-firm interactions from exchange-mandated online platforms in China and a sample of listed firms from 2010 to 2023. Cost stickiness is measured using standard asymmetric cost models. We examine the role of investor attention intensity, inquiry complexity, and managerial feedback, and employ robustness checks including matched samples, heteroscedasticity-based instrumental variable, and alternative measures of cost stickiness. Findings Our results indicate that greater investor attention to cost-related activities significantly reduces cost stickiness. The disciplining effect operates through two channels: reducing resource adjustment frictions and constraining managerial empire-building incentives. The effect is stronger for firms lacking alternative communication channels, for complex investor inquiries, and when managerial responses are more detailed. Originality/value This study provides evidence that retail investors, through regulated interaction platforms, can influence firms’ operational decisions by mitigating cost stickiness. It extends research on asymmetric cost behavior beyond internal firm determinants, highlights the governance role of retail investor engagement, and links interactive disclosure platforms to corporate cost management.