Self-Certifying Proof-Carrying Identity for Registrar-Free Namespace Networks

This paper proposes a registrar-free identity architecture based on self-certifying cryptographic identifiers, proof-carrying attribution lineage, and authenticated operational continuity. Rather than treating identity legitimacy as institutionally assigned through registrars, certificate authorities, or centralized trust providers, the framework explores how operational identity legitimacy may emerge directly from admissible cryptographic continuity under an explicitly declared threat model. The paper introduces several compositional primitives, including self-certifying namespace derivation, proof-carrying identity continuity, provenance-scoped attribution validity, operational attribution lineage, and scalable provenance density gradients. It also distinguishes between authorship continuity, operational continuity, and semantic continuity as separate but composable continuity classes. The proposed framework aims to provide a potentially unsquattable self-certifying namespace under correct cryptographic operation and uncompromised key custody assumptions, while remaining explicit about its limitations and threat boundaries. The work is positioned as a conceptual and architectural contribution at the intersection of distributed systems, cryptographic identity, decentralized networking, and provenance-aware network architecture.