Sentience. Not Necessarily a Problem?

Pain is often portrayed as the guardian of life. Unpleasant sensations are undisputedly in the service of the self-preservation of living beings. However, it is questionable whether the first sensations in evolution must have been those of pain. The emergence of a new property cannot be derived from the function that the property has once it is there. In evolution, new properties are not produced by needs (this would be teleological thinking), but by mutations and selection. Accordingly, rather than pain, the first sensation of an early creature may just as well have been a neutral (or pleasant) sensation. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the self-preservation of early organisms and evolutionarily old and successful species (such as bacteria or jellyfish) is achieved by biochemical processes without the involvement of consciousness. The individuals of evolutionarily very old extant species may still have a kind of luxury primitive consciousness (restricted to neutral or pleasant sensations) hovering above organismal needs. This has ramifications as regards argumentative standards of antinatalist moral theory, for example.

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Publication Details

Journal
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Published
2026-05-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0963180126100139
Primary Topic
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Sentience. Not Necessarily a Problem?

Karim Akerma
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
article

Sentience. Not Necessarily a Problem?

Karim Akerma
article en

Abstract

Pain is often portrayed as the guardian of life. Unpleasant sensations are undisputedly in the service of the self-preservation of living beings. However, it is questionable whether the first sensations in evolution must have been those of pain. The emergence of a new property cannot be derived from the function that the property has once it is there. In evolution, new properties are not produced by needs (this would be teleological thinking), but by mutations and selection. Accordingly, rather than pain, the first sensation of an early creature may just as well have been a neutral (or pleasant) sensation. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the self-preservation of early organisms and evolutionarily old and successful species (such as bacteria or jellyfish) is achieved by biochemical processes without the involvement of consciousness. The individuals of evolutionarily very old extant species may still have a kind of luxury primitive consciousness (restricted to neutral or pleasant sensations) hovering above organismal needs. This has ramifications as regards argumentative standards of antinatalist moral theory, for example.

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
University of Cambridge
Life in Land
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
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