State Attorneys General, Revolving Doors and the Market for Regulatory Compliance

Abstract Revolving door research on government lawyers moving into the private sector shows multiple potential outcomes. Such lawyers may utilize connections in government to secure special favors for their new clients, in a manner consistent with regulatory capture (the Quid Pro Quo Hypothesis). Conversely, they may utilize their knowledge and expertise to improve the regulatory compliance of their clients (the Regulatory Schooling Hypothesis). I examine these hypotheses in the context of state attorneys general (state AGs) and multi-state litigation. Multi-state litigation is an important and prominent form of state and federal regulation. Law firms have responded by creating “State AG Practices,” which help companies cope with the regulatory threat presented by state AGs. I utilize sixteen semi-structured interviews, career data of 194 state AGs, and legal media secondary sources to analyze whether AGs move through the revolving door in order to improve regulatory compliance or facilitate regulatory capture. Contrary to some media accounts, former AGs primarily bring expertise, rather than government connections, to the private sector, but using this expertise is often easier when well-known former colleagues are across the negotiating table.