Firm‐Level Tournament Incentives and Social Decoupling: Evidence From the United States

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether tournament‐based executive incentives exacerbate social decoupling. Using 4468 firm‐year observations from S&P 500 firms between 2010 and 2022, we find that stronger tournament incentives are associated with higher levels of social decoupling. This association is stronger in firms without ESG‐linked compensation, those facing higher product market competition, and those with greater board co‐option. Additional analyses indicate that increased agency costs constitute an important channel. The analysis employs firm and year fixed‐effects regressions and is supplemented by alternative decoupling measures, change‐on‐change analysis, instrumental variable estimation, and a Heckman two‐stage model. This study advances the literature on executive incentives and corporate social responsibility by identifying tournament incentives as a novel antecedent of social decoupling. By focusing explicitly on the social dimension of ESG, the study responds to calls for more disaggregated analyses of sustainability dimensions and highlights the unintended consequences of competitive compensation structures.