Susan Stebbing on responsibility

Abstract Manipulation arguments aim to establish that if determinism is true, then people are not morally responsible for their actions. These arguments appeal to the judgment that agents whose actions result from manipulation are not responsible. It is then claimed that if determinism is true, then ordinary agents are relevantly like the manipulated agents. So, ordinary agents are not responsible either. This paper examines an exchange between Wisdom (Problems of mind and matter. Cambridge University Press. 1934) and Susan Stebbing (Philosophy and the physicists. Routledge. 1937/2018) over an early manipulation argument. This paper examines Stebbing’s response, with comparison to contemporary positions. For Stebbing, the distinction between an agential and environmental cause is delicate. So, some cases of manipulation would not rise to the level of actions on the part of the agent. In other cases, although Stebbing would agree that the manipulator would be responsible for the action, she would argue that the agent can also be responsible. The temptation to say otherwise arises because the manipulator would not have standing to blame the agent. I conclude by reflecting on the connection of Stebbing’s views of responsibility to her projects on critical thinking.