Normative perspectives on the zetetic turn

According to the strongest version of the zetetic turn which is the focus of this thesis, norms of inquiry, so-called zetetic norms, form a single normative domain with epistemic norms. The debate with those who defend the traditional view, according to which norms of inquiry do not form part of the epistemic normative domain, focuses on the nature of the epistemic and the scope of the epistemic normative domain. However, given the fundamental disagreement on this issue between those who defend the zetetic turn and those who oppose it, I propose a different, arguably more fruitful, approach to the debate, which focuses on the concept of a normative domain. This involves assessing whether the norms which are said to constitute the epistemic normative domain by advocates of the zetetic turn form a sui generis normative domain in the first place. For this purpose, I will offer two normative reconstructions of Jane Friedman, the view’s foremost proponent’s arguments, as proceeding from a conception of normative domains to a view about the epistemic normative domain. I will then assess whether the two criteria which are taken to individuate the epistemic normative domain satisfy the requirements on properties for individuating normative domains, namely that they be shared by all norms falling under that domain, that they be non-arbitrary and that they distinguish the epistemic normative domain from other normative domains. I will then suggest that the conclusions of this assessment should prompt a re-evaluation of the traditional view. Thus, starting from a plausible conception of normative domains, I hope to outline an appealing picture of the epistemic normative domain, which offers an independently persuasive picture of norms over both belief-formation and inquiry, while at the same time avoiding Friedman’s objections against the view, which are taken to motivate the zetetic turn.