EIDA: Ephemeral Identity Distribution Architecture

guaranteesit proves that a public key belongs to an entity, but cannotguarantee that a given transaction originates from that entity at thatmoment. This gap enables replay attacks, key-reuse vulnerabilities,and long-term compromise cascades.EIDA (Ephemeral Identity Distribution Architecture) addresses thisgap by introducing. The core primitive,ePriPub, is a single-use ephemeral key pair derived per transactionfrom the user's permanent identity inside a hardware-backed isolationzone (TPM 2.0 / TEE). Once used, the ePriPub components are de-stroyed and the Certicate Authority (CA) issues a fresh single-usecerticateno persistent state is required.EIDA shifts the trust model from centralised authority vericationto cryptographic transaction uniqueness, distributing security to theuser without requiring trusted intermediaries.identity-level forward secrecyKeywords: ephemeral keys, forward secrecy, PKI, hardware security, replayprotection, identity architecture1 ProblemToday, companies responsible for securing user identities are under con-stant attack. A single breach of a centralised security system can exposethe personal data of millions of users. This is an inevitable consequence ofthe current architecture: security is concentrated, and concentration createshigh-value targets.EIDA proposes distributing this responsibility to user devices. In a de-centralised model, an attacker who compromises a single node gains accessto only one person's datanot millions. Large technology companies are nolonger the primary target. The attack surface shrinks from a single criticalsystem to millions of individual devices.1Classical PKI reinforces this centralisation problem. It guarantees that apublic key belongs to an entity, but cannot verify that a specic transactionoriginates from that entity at that momentenabling replay attacks, keyreuse, and long-term compromise cascades.The current security crisis is not a failure of implementation, but of rchitecture. By transitioning from centralized silos to EIDA’s distributed model, we eliminate high-value targets. An adversary's cost to compromise a single node now outweighs the reward, rendering large-scale attacks economically unviable.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-05-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20113670
Primary Topic
Access Control and Trust
Type
article
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article

EIDA: Ephemeral Identity Distribution Architecture

Güven Acar
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Access Control and Trust
article

EIDA: Ephemeral Identity Distribution Architecture

Güven Acar
article en

Abstract

guaranteesit proves that a public key belongs to an entity, but cannotguarantee that a given transaction originates from that entity at thatmoment. This gap enables replay attacks, key-reuse vulnerabilities,and long-term compromise cascades.EIDA (Ephemeral Identity Distribution Architecture) addresses thisgap by introducing. The core primitive,ePriPub, is a single-use ephemeral key pair derived per transactionfrom the user's permanent identity inside a hardware-backed isolationzone (TPM 2.0 / TEE). Once used, the ePriPub components are de-stroyed and the Certicate Authority (CA) issues a fresh single-usecerticateno persistent state is required.EIDA shifts the trust model from centralised authority vericationto cryptographic transaction uniqueness, distributing security to theuser without requiring trusted intermediaries.identity-level forward secrecyKeywords: ephemeral keys, forward secrecy, PKI, hardware security, replayprotection, identity architecture1 ProblemToday, companies responsible for securing user identities are under con-stant attack. A single breach of a centralised security system can exposethe personal data of millions of users. This is an inevitable consequence ofthe current architecture: security is concentrated, and concentration createshigh-value targets.EIDA proposes distributing this responsibility to user devices. In a de-centralised model, an attacker who compromises a single node gains accessto only one person's datanot millions. Large technology companies are nolonger the primary target. The attack surface shrinks from a single criticalsystem to millions of individual devices.1Classical PKI reinforces this centralisation problem. It guarantees that apublic key belongs to an entity, but cannot verify that a specic transactionoriginates from that entity at that momentenabling replay attacks, keyreuse, and long-term compromise cascades.The current security crisis is not a failure of implementation, but of rchitecture. By transitioning from centralized silos to EIDA’s distributed model, we eliminate high-value targets. An adversary's cost to compromise a single node now outweighs the reward, rendering large-scale attacks economically unviable.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
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Access Control and Trust
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