Network Topology and Systemic Contagion Among Alternative Asset Managers: Evidence from GP-LP-Bank Interconnections

Constructs a tripartite GP-LP-Bank network (179 GPs, 113 LPs, 35 banks; 327 nodes) using SEC Form ADV filings, 13F holdings, and BIS bank-NBFI lending statistics. Bilateral exposures reconstructed via maximum-entropy iterative proportional fitting from aggregate marginals, with power-law sparsification calibrated to scale-free patterns. Applies DebtRank methodology (Battiston et al. 2012) to derive per-node systemic-importance scores. The March 2026 private-credit crisis serves as a natural experiment: betweenness centrality predicts gating order (Spearman rho = 0.195, p = 0.009); Blackstone ranks first by eigenvector centrality. Monte Carlo stress tests (10,000 scenarios) show simultaneous distress at the three most central nodes generates 11.6% of network value vs 1.9% for random nodes, a 6.2x amplification. Proposes a Designated Systemically Important Non-Bank Financial Institution (D-SINBFI) framework calibrated to network topology metrics. Limitations section discusses bilateral-reconstruction caveats, network coverage limits, DebtRank monotonicity assumption, cross-channel transmission magnitude uncertainty, and single-episode anchor.