Common = ineffective? A replication attempt of the normative dilution effect in the context of political apologies
The normative dilution effect suggests that perceiving a behavior as normative can undermine its effectiveness, particularly in contexts where its communicative value matters. Intergroup apologies offer a compelling test case for this effect, as conveying sincere motives is key to their effectiveness in promoting forgiveness. To date, only one quantitative study (Okimoto, et al., 2015) has tested this effect. We therefore aimed to replicate the normative dilution effect a decade after the original study in two experimental studies. Across two samples of Australian participants ( N total = 1075), we found no evidence supporting the normative dilution effect. When experimentally induced to perceive political apologies as more common, Australian participants did not desire an apology more, perceive apologies as less sincere, report being less willing to forgive Japan for the mistreatment of Australian POWs, or attribute more ulterior motives to the act of apologizing. Additionally, within the control group, we found little support for the pattern of associations among apology commonness, perceived apology sincerity, and willingness to forgive predicted by the normative dilution effect. We discuss the implications of these findings for the theory of the normative dilution effect. • Normative dilution effect is not supported experimentally or correlationally. • Perceiving political apologies as more common does not affect apology sincerity. • Perceiving political apologies as more common does not reduce forgiveness.
Authors
- Rebecca Littman (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8119-0576)
- Vlada Trofimchuk
Institutions
- University of Illinois Chicago (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Published
- 2026-05-09
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2026.104938
- Primary Topic
- Forgiveness and Related Behaviors
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00