Institutionalizing REDD+ safeguards in Ghana: A reinforcement of power asymmetries and existing practices

REDD+ programs are orchestrated with safeguards to address social and environmental injustices and promote non‑carbon values. However, there is limited understanding of how safeguard commitments are adapted into national policy and practice, as previous studies have focused narrowly on specific safeguard elements or on REDD+ more broadly. Using the concept of institutional bricolage, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis, we conducted an embedded case study examining how Ghana adapted and implemented REDD+ safeguards at the national and project levels. We found that at the national policy level, the government, through consultants, integrated a selection of donor safeguards into a hybrid set of safeguard principles to meet funding requirements, sidelining local communities and their civil society representatives from the national safeguard policymaking process. At the project level, safeguards are partially implemented because the government only leveraged its existing networks, including cocoa companies and NGOs that were already implementing some safeguard interventions in the landscapes. However, cocoa companies cherry-pick safeguards that align with their interests, and international NGOs implement safeguards that intersect with their ongoing work, perpetuating existing practices and overlooking safeguards that do not align with their activities or interests. We conclude that safeguards are used instrumentally to meet donor requirements without real commitment to implementation. We recommend that the government and donors delink safeguards interpretation from donor compliance and institute a dedicated finance stream to implement REDD+ safeguards. • Ghana's REDD+ safeguards were designed primarily to meet funding requirements. • Consultants led the safeguard policymaking process, sidelining local stakeholders. • Safeguard implementation is limited and uneven in the cocoa forest REDD+ program. • Sufficient finance should be dedicated to implementing REDD+ safeguards.

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Publication Details

Journal
Forest Policy and Economics
Published
2026-05-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2026.103801
Primary Topic
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Institutionalizing REDD+ safeguards in Ghana: A reinforcement of power asymmetries and existing practices

Juliette Alenda-Demoutiez, Ingrid Visseren- Hamakers, Esther Wahabu
Forest Policy and Economics
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
article

Institutionalizing REDD+ safeguards in Ghana: A reinforcement of power asymmetries and existing practices

Juliette Alenda-Demoutiez, Ingrid Visseren- Hamakers, Esther Wahabu
article en

Abstract

REDD+ programs are orchestrated with safeguards to address social and environmental injustices and promote non‑carbon values. However, there is limited understanding of how safeguard commitments are adapted into national policy and practice, as previous studies have focused narrowly on specific safeguard elements or on REDD+ more broadly. Using the concept of institutional bricolage, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis, we conducted an embedded case study examining how Ghana adapted and implemented REDD+ safeguards at the national and project levels. We found that at the national policy level, the government, through consultants, integrated a selection of donor safeguards into a hybrid set of safeguard principles to meet funding requirements, sidelining local communities and their civil society representatives from the national safeguard policymaking process. At the project level, safeguards are partially implemented because the government only leveraged its existing networks, including cocoa companies and NGOs that were already implementing some safeguard interventions in the landscapes. However, cocoa companies cherry-pick safeguards that align with their interests, and international NGOs implement safeguards that intersect with their ongoing work, perpetuating existing practices and overlooking safeguards that do not align with their activities or interests. We conclude that safeguards are used instrumentally to meet donor requirements without real commitment to implementation. We recommend that the government and donors delink safeguards interpretation from donor compliance and institute a dedicated finance stream to implement REDD+ safeguards. • Ghana's REDD+ safeguards were designed primarily to meet funding requirements. • Consultants led the safeguard policymaking process, sidelining local stakeholders. • Safeguard implementation is limited and uneven in the cocoa forest REDD+ program. • Sufficient finance should be dedicated to implementing REDD+ safeguards.

Forest Policy and EconomicsVol. 188
Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
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