Systematic Governance for the Maintenance of Agriproduct Regional Public Brands: Insights From an Agent‐Based Simulation

ABSTRACT This exploratory simulation study, grounded in the Yangcheng Lake mitten crab case, proposes a systemic governance framework for agriproduct regional public brands by examining the interaction between internal reneging and external infringement. A simulation model compares sole external enforcement with multi‐level coordinated governance, assessing how technological measures, organisational cooperation and internal governance curb reneging and prevent infringement within this specific context. Results suggest that, under the conditions observed, sole external enforcement may fail to ensure long‐term brand stability, whereas multi‐level coordinated governance shows greater potential for restraining internal reneging, preventing external infringement and disrupting their reinforcing cycle. Moving beyond the traditional counterfeiting‐focused framework, this case‐based exploration advances theoretical understanding of regional public brand governance and provides policymakers with insights and simulation tools to support a shift from reactive to proactive governance, while acknowledging that further empirical testing is needed to establish generalisability.