Normativity and the Indefinite Singular in Morality

Abstract Indefinite singular (IS) noun phrases—such as “A virtuous person prioritizes self-improvement”—are a familiar but under-theorized feature of moral discourse. While widely used in definitions and generalizations about character, their semantic and normative significance has gone largely unexamined. This paper argues that IS moral generalizations serve a dual function in moral thought: a definitional role in articulating principles and a metalinguistic role in negotiating moral concepts. We propose that many IS moral generalizations operate not merely as descriptive statements but as normative proposals that shape how moral terms should be used. We distinguish these uses from standard characterizing generalizations and show that IS constructions allow for moral concepts—such as virtue, goodness, and rightness—to be dynamically defined, contested, and taught. This reveals a novel perspective on how language contributes to the evolution and application of moral norms.