Agent-Based Modeling of the Greenwashing Behavior of Building Material Enterprises Under Public Opinion Influence

While most existing studies addressing greenwashing emphasize governmental regulation, they often overlook the role of public participation. This study examines how managers’ risk preferences affect enterprise decision-making under public scrutiny. In this study, an agent-based simulation model incorporating enterprises, media, and consumers is established on the basis of signaling theory and the wolf-sheep model. The conclusions are as follows: (1) Both positive and negative public opinion can curb greenwashing behavior in building material enterprises, but negative public opinion intensity is more effective in this context. (2) Regardless of whether building material enterprises operate in positive or negative public opinion scenarios, constraining managers’ risk preferences consistently serves as an effective internal mechanism for curbing greenwashing behavior. (3) The effectiveness of constraint managers’ risk preferences in suppressing greenwashing behavior is influenced by the external public opinion scenario, with its inhibitory effect being more pronounced under negative public opinion scenarios. This study incorporates public opinion as a key external factor and integrates dynamic managers’ risk preferences into a behavioral simulation framework. It expands the theoretical understanding of greenwashing decision-making mechanisms and offers practical implications for regulatory enforcement and enterprise governance.