CRISPR governance at the nexus of public health and national security: Priority setting and risk calculus in Turkey’s emerging bioeconomy

CRISPR-based genome editing has moved rapidly from a laboratory technique into a contested object of governance. In public health framings, CRISPR is presented as a platform for treating rare and severe genetic diseases, advancing diagnostics, and reducing long-term burdens on health systems. In national security framings, the same capabilities raise dual-use concerns, including misuse of gene editing and gene synthesis, and motivate research security agendas that manage access to sensitive knowledge, materials, and supply chains. This paper asks two linked questions. Who sets priorities for CRISPR when both public health and national security claims are mobilized, and under what risk calculus are trade-offs justified? Drawing on science and technology studies, the paper uses co-production and sociotechnical imaginaries to show how definitions of benefit, harm, and acceptable uncertainty are assembled through institutions rather than settled by technical expertise alone (Jasanoff, 2004; Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). Sarewitz’s critique that science cannot resolve many risk controversies provides a baseline for analyzing legitimacy (Sarewitz, 2015), while Doudna’s reflections after the He Jiankui episode highlight the limits of self-governance and the need for enforceable oversight (Doudna & Kearney, 2020). Empirically, the paper presents a desk-based case study of Turkey, focusing on two post-pandemic capability-building tracks. First, domestic vaccine development and authorization, exemplified by TURKOVAC, which became a public symbol of biomedical sovereignty (Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2021). Second, the state-supported genomic infrastructure building through the Türkiye Genome Project, led by TÜSEB, aims to enable precision medicine by expanding national genome and bioinformatics capacity (TÜSEB, n.d.). The analysis reveals that public health and national security often do not function as a clear binary. Instead, priorities are negotiated through boundary work among ministries, regulators, universities, and industry, with uncertainty managed via global guidance documents and narratives of urgency. The paper concludes by proposing bounded openness. It combines inclusive deliberation on value conflicts with targeted biosecurity controls focused on high-consequence misuse pathways, rather than broad restrictions that could undermine public health innovation.