Dynamic Optimization and Collaborative Mechanisms for Value Co-Creation: A Four-Party Evolutionary Game Study in Digital Innovation Ecosystems

Value co-creation among diverse actors in digital innovation ecosystems (DIEs) exhibits characteristics of high complexity and dynamic evolution. Grounded in the Quadruple Helix Theory, this study develops a conceptual model that interlinks “supervisory guides, knowledge providers, technology transformers, and user demand parties.” This model is defined by organizational oversight as its nexus, knowledge and technology as its foundation, outcome transformation as its core, and user needs as its orientation. Building upon this conceptual foundation, we establish a four-party evolutionary game model involving “innovation regulators (government), innovation producers (academic/research institutions), innovation decomposers (enterprises), and innovation consumers (users).” This analytical framework is then applied to systematically investigate the dynamic evolutionary mechanisms and collaborative pathways for value co-creation in DIEs. We construct the payoff matrix and replicator dynamics to derive the system’s Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs). Numerical simulations via MATLAB R2023b identify the stability conditions for each party’s strategic choices and unravel the influence mechanisms of key parameters. The results demonstrate nine distinct ESSs, categorized into three types: low-level stability, regulation-dominated transitional stability, and high-level cooperative stability. While the agents’ initial strategies do not alter the system’s final equilibrium state, they significantly impact the speed of evolutionary convergence. Critical factors—including regulators’ intervention costs, subsidy and penalty mechanisms, producers’ and decomposers’ cooperation and default costs, and consumer feedback behaviors—collectively drive the system toward the ideal (1, 1, 1, 1) equilibrium. Theoretically, this study enriches the perspective on multi-agent collaboration in value co-creation by introducing a dynamic quantitative analytical framework, thereby addressing a notable gap in the literature. Practically, it provides actionable insights for mechanism design and a solid foundation for policy optimization, aiming to foster a synergistic governance system that integrates “regulatory guidance, market incentives, and social feedback.”

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems
Published
2026-04-29
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14050483
Primary Topic
Service and Product Innovation
Type
article
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article

Dynamic Optimization and Collaborative Mechanisms for Value Co-Creation: A Four-Party Evolutionary Game Study in Digital Innovation Ecosystems

Yanjun Dong, Yongchang Jiang
Systems
Service and Product Innovation
article

Dynamic Optimization and Collaborative Mechanisms for Value Co-Creation: A Four-Party Evolutionary Game Study in Digital Innovation Ecosystems

Yanjun Dong, Yongchang Jiang
article en

Abstract

Value co-creation among diverse actors in digital innovation ecosystems (DIEs) exhibits characteristics of high complexity and dynamic evolution. Grounded in the Quadruple Helix Theory, this study develops a conceptual model that interlinks “supervisory guides, knowledge providers, technology transformers, and user demand parties.” This model is defined by organizational oversight as its nexus, knowledge and technology as its foundation, outcome transformation as its core, and user needs as its orientation. Building upon this conceptual foundation, we establish a four-party evolutionary game model involving “innovation regulators (government), innovation producers (academic/research institutions), innovation decomposers (enterprises), and innovation consumers (users).” This analytical framework is then applied to systematically investigate the dynamic evolutionary mechanisms and collaborative pathways for value co-creation in DIEs. We construct the payoff matrix and replicator dynamics to derive the system’s Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs). Numerical simulations via MATLAB R2023b identify the stability conditions for each party’s strategic choices and unravel the influence mechanisms of key parameters. The results demonstrate nine distinct ESSs, categorized into three types: low-level stability, regulation-dominated transitional stability, and high-level cooperative stability. While the agents’ initial strategies do not alter the system’s final equilibrium state, they significantly impact the speed of evolutionary convergence. Critical factors—including regulators’ intervention costs, subsidy and penalty mechanisms, producers’ and decomposers’ cooperation and default costs, and consumer feedback behaviors—collectively drive the system toward the ideal (1, 1, 1, 1) equilibrium. Theoretically, this study enriches the perspective on multi-agent collaboration in value co-creation by introducing a dynamic quantitative analytical framework, thereby addressing a notable gap in the literature. Practically, it provides actionable insights for mechanism design and a solid foundation for policy optimization, aiming to foster a synergistic governance system that integrates “regulatory guidance, market incentives, and social feedback.”

SystemsVol. 14(5)
Harbin University of Commerce (CN)
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Service and Product Innovation
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