Research on Construction Network Degradation Driven by Greenwashing: Cross-Scale Nested Modeling with Quadrilateral Games and Differential Equations

This study focuses on the argument that greenwashing behavior (GWB) among key stakeholders leads to the degradation of governance networks in large-scale construction projects. Grounded in opportunism theory, a cross-scale computational model is developed by integrating a four-party evolutionary game with differential dynamics to capture the co-evolution of stakeholder strategies and network states. The results indicate that GWB exhibits free-riding and herd-like characteristics, and that governance networks possess a degradation equilibrium. Sensitivity analysis based on 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations shows that the frequency of GWB by subcontractors has the greatest impact on network degradation (sensitivity range: 0 to −0.98), followed by general contractors (0 to −0.38), while the influence of supervisory roles is relatively weaker. In contrast, contractual penalties demonstrate limited effectiveness (sensitivity range: −0.08 to 0.06), whereas reputational loss exerts a stronger inhibitory effect (up to −0.5 during the mid-stage evolution). These findings suggest that contract-based governance alone is insufficient to constrain GWB, thereby challenging the conventional assumption of its effectiveness. The results highlight the necessity of shifting from contract-centric governance toward reputation-based and market-oriented mechanisms to effectively mitigate GWB and enhance the resilience of green construction governance.