A Booby Trap Game
Strategic Defense Against a Resource Gathering Attacker In many real-world security settings, defenders must monitor a space using limited resources while attackers try to exploit gaps in coverage without being detected. The space may be a shop, museum, or airport, where the defenders use hidden cameras to detect thieves or smugglers, who wish to steal items or conceal contraband. To capture this interaction, Lidbetter and Lin present an attacker-defender game in “A Booby Trap Game.” The defender places several hidden traps within a search space, while the attacker selects a subset of that space to exploit. The attacker’s reward is proportional to the size of the selected subset if the subset does not contain any trap; otherwise, the attacker gets nothing. The article presents optimal (max-min/min-max), or near optimal, randomized strategies for both players for various spaces—including circles, line segments, two-connected networks, trees, and arbitrary Lebesgue measurable, path-connected subsets of Euclidean space.
Authors
- Kyle Y. Lin (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3769-1891)
- Thomas Lidbetter (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-2899)
Institutions
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- Naval Postgraduate School (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Operations Research
- Published
- 2026-04-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2024.1518
- Primary Topic
- Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00