The “Logic of Place” in “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview” --Through the Changing Positioning of the “Predicate”--

This paper explores the “logic of place” as presented in Nishida Kitaro's final major work “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview” (1945). The use of “logic of place” in the title has often been cited as indicative of Nishida's philosophical consistency, tracing back to his mid-term paper “Place” (1926). However, despite using the same term, “place,” Nishida gives it a significantly different meaning in his final major work. The key difference lies in the positioning of the “predicate.” In his paper “Place,” Nishida inverted Aristotelian subject logic, defining “place” as “that which becomes a predicate and does not become a subject,” as opposed to “that which becomes a subject and does not become a predicate.” In contrast, “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview” argues that “that which becomes a predicate and does not become a subject” is only rational or general existence, which does not allow for the consideration of individual selves. It is suggested that while moral issues can be discussed from this perspective, religious considerations cannot. This paper reexamines the “logic of place” in “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview” by retracing the shift in the positioning of the “predicate.” This analysis will also contribute to our understanding of the key concept of “inverse correspondence” in his final major work.