The Problem of Evil in Early Nishitani Keiji : On the Re-appropriation of “Life”

This paper discusses the problem of evil in Nishitani's early philosophy from the perspective of the re-appropriation of “Life”. The problem that Nishitani pursued over many years is investigated particularly through the concept of self-love construed as attachment to the self. In early Nishitani, the problem of evil was not merely treated as one theme among others, but as a fundamental challenge that drives his philosophical inquiry. The standpoint of “originary subjectivity (根源的主体性)” which early Nishitani presents is also essentially linked to this problem. The positioning of the problem reflects Nishitani's concern with grasping “Life” anew from its very ground. The standpoint of “originary subjectivity” is situated as a break with the bondage of the “ego” and the appropriation of “Life” itself. Yet, examining his interpretation of radical evil (das radikale Böse) reveals that “Life” itself is not only the ground of human life but also the ground of evil. In other words, the standpoint contains two seemingly contradictory aspects: the appropriation and the negation of “Life” itself. This paper attempts to clarify how these two aspects are argued in Nishitani's thinking. After examining the grounds on which Nishitani evaluates the overcoming of self-love (self-attachment/ egoism) from the ethical standpoint and the standpoint of religious faith as insufficient, this paper presents the characteristics of “originary subjectivity”, and then considers the significance of “originary subjectivity” for the problem of evil.