A theory of the regional state: consent-based imbecility

The United Kingdom resists straightforward classification. It is neither a Jacobinic unitary state nor a federation, and its constitutional reforms since 1998 have rendered its traditional organising concepts obsolete. Federalism cannot accommodate a polity of four asymmetrical units in which one accounts for 85 per cent of the population. This article introduces a theory of the “regional state” as a form of voluntary union that differs from federalism in three ways. Using Albert Hirschman’s framework of exit, voice, and loyalty, it contends that the regional state comprises a tripartite structure—the Overall State, the Central State, and the Constituent Regions—where the overarching polity acts more as a forum for coordination than as a seat of sovereign authority (loyalty); the principle of equipollence, which ensures the constitutional equality of state law and regional law (voice); and the constitutional right to renegotiate membership, including democratic secession (exit). These elements must work together: without equipollence, cooperation risks centralisation; without a unifying state, autonomy risks fragmentation; and without exit, consociational techniques may trap rather than enable. The theory is applied to the United Kingdom but challenges traditional conceptions of statehood and decision-making in any asymmetric polity.