The Role of Institutional Transparency in Reducing Corruption Perceptions: A Cross-National Study of Developing Democracies

This paper examines the relationship between institutional transparency and perceptions of corruption in developing democracies. It argues that transparency is not merely a technical attribute of government disclosure but a political condition that shapes the credibility of anti-corruption efforts, the visibility of administrative behavior, and the ability of citizens and intermediaries to impose accountability. Drawing on cross-national research on corruption, transparency, e-government, open government data, and accountability, the article synthesizes the main mechanisms through which transparency can reduce corruption perceptions, while also identifying the institutional conditions under which the effect is muted. The review indicates that transparency tends to be more effective when it is paired with publicity, media freedom, electoral competition, and enforceable accountability channels. By contrast, formal transparency rules with weak enforcement, low civic oversight, or selective disclosure often produce only limited perceptual change. The manuscript therefore contributes a structured analytical framework for studying developing democracies, where institutional openness, digitalization, and corruption control remain uneven. The article concludes that transparency can lower corruption perceptions, but only when it is embedded in a broader ecosystem of institutional oversight.