Judge for yourself? The impact of controls on the rental market in interwar New York

This paper examines the impact of early 20th-century rent control laws in New York City, exploiting judicial discretion as a source of variation. The 1920 regulations empowered municipal court judges to decide whether rent increases were “reasonable”, with rulings shaped by partisan affiliation. We assemble a new dataset of over 20,000 rental listings from the New York Times (1918–1930) and more than 7000 archival building permits, linked to records on 125 district judges. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design at municipal court district boundaries, we find that market rents rose by nearly 10 percent when crossing from Democrat- to Republican-controlled districts after rent control. We examine supply effects using a difference-in-differences design. We show that judicially enforced rent control substantially reduced residential investment: total residential investment was about 76 percent higher in landlord-friendly districts during the rent-control period. Together, these findings demonstrate how judicial discretion shaped both prices and investment, leading to systematic differences in profits and construction activity across districts, which likely shaped the medium-run build environment.

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Urban Economics
Published
2026-04-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2026.103859
Primary Topic
Housing Market and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

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article

Judge for yourself? The impact of controls on the rental market in interwar New York

Journal of Urban Economics
Housing Market and Economics
article

Judge for yourself? The impact of controls on the rental market in interwar New York

article en

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of early 20th-century rent control laws in New York City, exploiting judicial discretion as a source of variation. The 1920 regulations empowered municipal court judges to decide whether rent increases were “reasonable”, with rulings shaped by partisan affiliation. We assemble a new dataset of over 20,000 rental listings from the New York Times (1918–1930) and more than 7000 archival building permits, linked to records on 125 district judges. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design at municipal court district boundaries, we find that market rents rose by nearly 10 percent when crossing from Democrat- to Republican-controlled districts after rent control. We examine supply effects using a difference-in-differences design. We show that judicially enforced rent control substantially reduced residential investment: total residential investment was about 76 percent higher in landlord-friendly districts during the rent-control period. Together, these findings demonstrate how judicial discretion shaped both prices and investment, leading to systematic differences in profits and construction activity across districts, which likely shaped the medium-run build environment.

Journal of Urban EconomicsVol. 153
Cologne Institute for Economic Research (DE), Trinity College Dublin (IE)
H2020 European Research Council
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Housing Market and Economics
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