Research on Evolutionary Game and Implementation Strategies for Promoting Near-Zero Energy Building Technologies

As a core decarbonization technology, the scaling up of Near-Zero Energy Building (NZEB) technologies under the “dual carbon” goal necessitates collaboration among governments, technology suppliers, and construction enterprises. However, high research and development (R&D) costs coupled with low market acceptance impede widespread adoption. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze strategic interactions among stakeholders. Using MATLAB 2022B simulations, we simulate the strategy sets for the government (subsidize/no subsidy), suppliers (R&D/no R&D), and enterprises (procure/no purchase). The results identify two Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS): a market-driven ESS (0, 1, 1) emerges when the green premium (Pm) exceeds the incremental cost (Cb); while a policy-driven ESS (1, 1, 1) requires government subsidies (S) to offset R&D gaps, specifically when S>Cr/α−Pmz. These findings provide a theoretical basis for understanding the synergistic mechanisms underlying NZEB adoption and highlight the dynamic interplay between policy incentives and market forces.