Reference Without Representation

One of the most prevailing ideas within contemporary philosophy of language is Representationalism: the idea that there is a word-world relation which plays a key role for explaining how language works. This relation is usually invoked both to explain what our utterances are about – what names and noun-phrases refer to – and what our utterances mean – how they represent the world as being. The topic of this thesis is to critique this idea and explore how we can explain communication in its absence.In the first chapter, I survey the existing theories of this word-world relation in the literature in terms of what they argue establishes that a certain expression represents a particular object. In the second chapter, I construct an argument for why we have no reason to expect that speakers of a language would have a shared understanding of which objects are represented by which expressions and that this prevents a representationalist explanation of how we can communicate.In the latter half of the thesis, I outline the alternative framework which my papers have been building towards. The idea is to start from what it means to understand expressions and utterances and construct an account of communication as a process aimed at mutual understanding. Specifically, I argue that there are as many different ways in which one can understand an expression as there are linguistic functions which that expression fulfil. Further, I argue that the extent to which a speaker and hearer need to agree on what an utterance means in order to communicate depends on the practical purposes of the conversation. This allows the account to avoid the epistemic problems outlined in the first part of the thesis. Further, I present a non-representational framework for modal reasoning in terms of normatively governed belief change and argue that it is both suited for a theory o understanding and as a semantics for modal logic.Finally, I apply these ideas to develop an account of referential communication as what enables interpersonal co-ordination with regards to the world. I argue that referential expressions fulfil two distinct functions – with regards to the co-ordination of information and action respectively – and that these provide different conditions for what it takes to understand utterances of them. I end by sketching how the resulting account can explain common intuitions about how social relations can extend the reach of our referential expressions and when reference is preserved with respect to counterfactual reasoning.