[研究ノート] 信念 (belief) と亜信念 (alief) について 研究動向の概観およびMandelbaum／Danónの論争の検討

We sometimes take actions that contradict our beliefs or desires--for example, we may hesitate to walk on a glass floor high above the ground even though we are certain that it is completely safe. Or we may hesitate to wear clothes that were previously worn by someone we dislike, even though we are certain that human properties cannot be physically transmitted. Gendler (2008a) proposed the existence of the mental state of ‘alief’ to explain why we can behave in ways that contradict our beliefs and desires. Gendler defines alief as a mental state with associatively-linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, which is, unlike belief, not a propositional attitude and not reality-sensitive. There has already been a certain amount of research on this concept, but extremely few Japanese-language publications deal with it as a subject. In light of this situation, I will begin with a detailed introduction to the concept. In addition, I will summarise recent research trends, such as Mandelbaum's counter-argument that aliefs are indistinguishable from beliefs and other existing mental states in that they all possess propositional content (therefore, there is no reason to assume the existence of aliefs) and Danón's defence that the propositional content of aliefs is ‘semi-structured’, and in this respect, aliefs can be distinguished from beliefs and other mental states. Lastly, I will present, based on these studies, some issues for future study.