Tying the hands of coalition partners in international negotiations: Public dissent and constraining powers

Abstract Multiparty coalitions often delegate policymaking tasks to specific ministers while excluding others. This creates a delegation problem where ministers may pursue party instead of coalition goals. While such ministerial drift is well-studied in domestic policymaking, understanding in international negotiations is lacking. This paper examines when sidelined coalition parties employ public dissent as a strategy in international negotiations. I argue that dissent makes disagreement visible and can therefore constrain the compatriot minister. Using a formal model, I derive empirical implications for when outsiders should dissent according to this logic. For sidelined parties, this strategy is particularly attractive when they align more with other negotiators and lack institutional means to enforce coalition compromises. Focusing on the European Union, an empirical analysis of public dissent in parliamentary roll call votes (2004–2019) aligns well with the predictions of the formal model. This broadens our understanding of coalition policymaking in international settings.