Forcing for Second-Order Logic
Abstract Forcing is a fundamental set-theoretic technique, with which many independence results can be established. A famous example is the independence of the continuum hypothesis in ZFC set theory. Forcing is also well-known to be complex, and therefore difficult to master. Here, we provide a gentle introduction of forcing, by developing forcing for second-order logic. Second-order logic can be interpreted as a rudimentary kind of set theory. Although very limited as a theory of sets, second-order logic is rich enough to capture a form of the continuum hypothesis, as well as the generalized continuum hypothesis, which is slightly easier to state. We develop forcing for second-order logic in the form of possibility semantics, and use this to show that a second-order version of the generalized continuum hypothesis cannot be derived in a standard proof system for second-order logic. Mathematically, the results we obtain in this way are much weaker than standard independence results in set theory. However, as a consequence, we are able to avoid many technical complexities in the presentation of forcing. In this way, we hope that forcing for second-order logic can serve an expository function, of providing an accessible route towards understanding some of the central ideas behind forcing.
Authors
- Sam Roberts (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5031-8939)
- P. Fritz (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5785-4013)
Institutions
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- University College London (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Published
- 2026-04-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-026-09843-9
- Primary Topic
- Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Norges Forskningsråd