A cultural evolutionary model of attribute-dependent norms on behaviors with and without direct payoffs

Humans are strongly influenced by social norms, including those prescribing different behaviors based on individuals' attributes such as gender. Although such attribute-dependent norms are often inequitable and harmful, the evolutionary mechanisms behind their emergence and persistence remain elusive. Here, we develop a mathematical model of cultural evolution to investigate the dynamics of such norms. Our analysis yields two main findings. First, we show that attribute-dependent norms can evolve through social interactions even when they enforce completely arbitrary behaviors devoid of economic utility (e.g., clothing choices). Second, we find that socioeconomic environments (i.e., payoff structures such as modes of livelihood) influence the initial evolution of norms and leave lasting impacts even after environmental change. These findings provide a formal framework to understand the mechanism behind the emergence and persistence of arbitrary and unequal attribute-dependent norms, offering insights into how we might mitigate their societal harms.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Scientific Reports
Published
2026-04-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-49420-3
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

A cultural evolutionary model of attribute-dependent norms on behaviors with and without direct payoffs

Yasuo Ihara, Akito Miyoshi
Scientific Reports
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

A cultural evolutionary model of attribute-dependent norms on behaviors with and without direct payoffs

Yasuo Ihara, Akito Miyoshi
article en

Abstract

Humans are strongly influenced by social norms, including those prescribing different behaviors based on individuals' attributes such as gender. Although such attribute-dependent norms are often inequitable and harmful, the evolutionary mechanisms behind their emergence and persistence remain elusive. Here, we develop a mathematical model of cultural evolution to investigate the dynamics of such norms. Our analysis yields two main findings. First, we show that attribute-dependent norms can evolve through social interactions even when they enforce completely arbitrary behaviors devoid of economic utility (e.g., clothing choices). Second, we find that socioeconomic environments (i.e., payoff structures such as modes of livelihood) influence the initial evolution of norms and leave lasting impacts even after environmental change. These findings provide a formal framework to understand the mechanism behind the emergence and persistence of arbitrary and unequal attribute-dependent norms, offering insights into how we might mitigate their societal harms.

Scientific Reports
The University of Tokyo (JP)
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Gender equality
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.