Strategic Coordination Among U.S. Military Platforms in Operation Epic Fury: A Network Analysis of Open-Source Data

This quantitative study modeled and analyzed the strategic coordination network among U.S. military platforms during the initial phase (February 28–March 13, 2026) of Operation Epic Fury, the large-scale U.S. military campaign against Iran, using exclusively open-source intelligence (OSINT) data. Drawing on network theory, systems theory, and organizational coordination theory, the study constructed a social network of 40 nodes (military platforms) and 73 edges (inferred coordination ties) from a systematic corpus of official government releases, think-tank analyses, maritime and aviation tracking data, and specialized OSINT reports. The network was analyzed using centrality measures, community detection, temporal analysis, and topological assessment to address four research questions concerning network structure, platform centrality, temporal evolution, and community composition. Ten hypotheses were tested. Results revealed that the coordination network exhibited pronounced small-world properties (σ = 4.084) with high local clustering (0.564) and efficient average path lengths (3.573), but did not conform to a scale-free degree distribution. Centrality analysis identified a three-tier structural hierarchy: electronic warfare and cyber platforms (betweenness centrality 0.227–0.323) served as critical network brokers connecting disparate communities; aircraft carriers and aerial refueling tankers functioned as influence hubs (eigenvector centrality up to 0.642) and connectivity backbones (degree centrality up to 0.179); and specialized strike and defense platforms operated within eight distinct task-organized communities detected by the Louvain algorithm. Temporal analysis documented an OSINT temporal decay phenomenon, with platform-specific reporting concentrated in the initial 48-hour strike phase. Of 10 hypotheses, five were supported, two were not supported, and three were inconclusive due to data limitations. Findings carry implications for Department of War force design, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) architecture, electronic warfare investment priorities, and the development of OSINT-based operational assessment methodologies.