Virtue, value, and true beliefs: solving Wrenn’s problem of truth

Abstract Wrenn introduces a Problem of Truth. The problem is that two natural views about truth are at odds. The first is that truth confers value on beliefs; the second is that insofar as truth has an essence it is just saying things are as they are. But saying things are as they are does not appear to be a normative property; so how could it be a property that confers value on beliefs? Wrenn’s solution is to abandon the idea that truth confers value on beliefs. Nonetheless, he accepts that true beliefs are valuable. He argues that their value derives from a virtue, namely, the virtue of Truthfulness. My aim here is to investigate Wrenn’s Problem of Truth and his proposed solution. I argue that his solution fails because it runs afoul of the “wrong-reason” problem. I provide my own solution to the Problem of Truth on which conferring value is an essential property of truth, but not part of its essence. And lastly, I explore Wrenn’s implicit views about virtue and value, suggesting that they are at odds with a traditional view.