China’s top-heavy model of digital platform governance: an assessment of user governance responsibilities of digital platforms in Chinese law

To regulate the misconduct of platform users, China imposes legal responsibilities on digital platforms to govern users. The new governance structure has been underdiscussed in previous studies. This research examines platform responsibility clauses in Chinese laws to generalize and evaluate the fundamental structure of China’s platform governance. This research argues that China has developed an indirect, linear structure involving “regulator–platform (intermediary)–user (target)” for platform governance. This is a co-governance model that combines state-based public power and platform-based private governance. The Chinese model expands state regulatory competence and addresses the laissez-faire problem of pure self-governance. However, three drawbacks are identified: (1) platform responsibilities are primarily built on the ground of state-oriented regulatory efficiency, and certain responsibilities imposed by the state are beyond the reasonable competence of platforms; (2) platforms enjoy substantial governance power against users without being held liable for the overexercise of power; and (3) users are vulnerable to the undue exercise of platform power, but Chinese law extends insufficient protection for users. The Chinese model as a whole presents a top-heavy, power-centred structure, which enables state regulators to tighten regulation and allows platforms to reinforce private power by overregulation, but these “benefits” come dynamically at the expense of user rights. China has chosen this top-heavy structure because it satisfies the country’s core demands of addressing public concerns, improving state regulatory efficiency, ensuring national security, and achieving state-centred regulatory goals. Recent developments show that while China has been further strengthening the governance responsibilities of platforms, the abuse of governance power by platforms has drawn increasing attention from the state.

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Publication Details

Journal
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Published
2026-04-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07333-6
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

China’s top-heavy model of digital platform governance: an assessment of user governance responsibilities of digital platforms in Chinese law

Qian Li
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Digital Platforms and Economics
article

China’s top-heavy model of digital platform governance: an assessment of user governance responsibilities of digital platforms in Chinese law

Qian Li
article en

Abstract

To regulate the misconduct of platform users, China imposes legal responsibilities on digital platforms to govern users. The new governance structure has been underdiscussed in previous studies. This research examines platform responsibility clauses in Chinese laws to generalize and evaluate the fundamental structure of China’s platform governance. This research argues that China has developed an indirect, linear structure involving “regulator–platform (intermediary)–user (target)” for platform governance. This is a co-governance model that combines state-based public power and platform-based private governance. The Chinese model expands state regulatory competence and addresses the laissez-faire problem of pure self-governance. However, three drawbacks are identified: (1) platform responsibilities are primarily built on the ground of state-oriented regulatory efficiency, and certain responsibilities imposed by the state are beyond the reasonable competence of platforms; (2) platforms enjoy substantial governance power against users without being held liable for the overexercise of power; and (3) users are vulnerable to the undue exercise of platform power, but Chinese law extends insufficient protection for users. The Chinese model as a whole presents a top-heavy, power-centred structure, which enables state regulators to tighten regulation and allows platforms to reinforce private power by overregulation, but these “benefits” come dynamically at the expense of user rights. China has chosen this top-heavy structure because it satisfies the country’s core demands of addressing public concerns, improving state regulatory efficiency, ensuring national security, and achieving state-centred regulatory goals. Recent developments show that while China has been further strengthening the governance responsibilities of platforms, the abuse of governance power by platforms has drawn increasing attention from the state.

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Ocean University of China (CN)
Qingdao Postdoctoral Science Foundation, Postdoctoral Innovation Project of Shandong Province, Social Science Planning Project of Shandong Province
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Digital Platforms and Economics
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