Commentary: Astrophysical constraints on the simulation hypothesis for this Universe: why it is (nearly) impossible that we live in a simulation

Vazza has recently argued against the simulation hypothesis (SH), characterizing it as a "physically unrealistic" proposal on the grounds of the computational resources that would be required to calculate physical reality at three massive scales: the universe down to the Planck length, the Earth down to the Planck length, and the Earth down to neutrino interactions [1]. Vazza mathematically demonstrates that such calculations are not achievable given the computational power that would be necessary if the simulator's universe is governed by physics like our own. However, the scope of this project is substantially broader than Bostrom's original formulation of the SH. Bostrom's argument does not require the continual computation of the microphysical chain in its 1Simulation hypothesis: Vazza targets entirety, nor the ongoing rendering of large-scale structures at astronomical distances. Rather, Bostrom 24 explicitly acknowledges these limitations and proposes that, for the SH to hold, only the continual 25 rendering of subjective experience free of detectable anomalies is required [2]. This commentary therefore 26 aims to underscore a recurring conceptual framing error rather than to assess the numerical results or Bostrom's SH has been widely discussed in the literature. However, persistent conceptual difficulties 33 continue to arise in its interpretation and handling. One such difficulty appears when the hypothesis is 34 approached through assumptions about the minimum physical system requirements that must be simulated.For example, Vazza explicitly assumes that "a planet is the smallest system that 'the simulator' must model 36 to recreate the daily experience that humankind collectively considers reality" [1]. He further concedes, for 37 the sake of argument, additional resources sufficient to maintain consistent data for off-planet astronauts 38 and to keep astrophysicists 'busy' with plausible observations [1]. This assumption is not within the scope 39 of SH's commitments; such a claim is not made by Bostrom.Bostrom explicitly states "Simulating the entire universe down to the quantum level is obviously infeasible, 41 unless radically new physics is discovered" [2]. It is immediately after this admission that Bostrom frames 42 the SH in terms of computational rendering requirements: 43 But in order to get a realistic simulation of human experience, much less is needed-only whatever is 44 required to ensure that the simulated humans, interacting in normal human ways with their simulated